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AJbout the author: Writing this paper for his Economics of 
Developing Countries class (Fall 1993), Matt Werner '94, a 
political science major, with a minor in economics, described 
the class as "challenging" and as being a very good complement 
to his personal interests in state and community level 
development. Matt had the opportunity to continue his in-depth 
study of Zaire in the following spring semester, in a U.S. 
foreign relations class where he focussed on the historic and 
political aspects of Zaire. Matt proceeds to Sangamon State 
University where he will begin his Master's degree in Public 
Administration, which he hopes to use as his stepping stone to 
a career in state government. 
POLICIES FOR REFORMING 
ZAIRE'S SHATTERED ECONOMY 
Matthew W. Werner 
MEMORANDUM 
TOs Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi Kinshasa, Zaire 
FROM: Matthew W. Werner, Harvard University, Professor 
of Developmental Economics, Independent Structural 
Adjustment Consultant 
REs Report on the restructuring/revitalizing of Zaire's 
economy 
9 December 1993 
Dear Prime Minister Tshisekedi: 
I have enclosed the report you requested. This study has 
been very difficult due to the rapid change occurring in your 
country. Also, it was very difficult gaining data from the 
Mobutu regime and the Bank of Zaire (the central bank). 
As you are well aware, the situation in Zaire is dire. For 
all practical purposes, the economy has suffered complete 
collapse. I found this report to be quite challenging; because 
of this, I hope you find my recommendations helpful and that you 
are able to implement them when your government gains power. 
I structured the report as you requested, with a brief 
economic/political history, followed by a section concerning the*] 
present economy, and finally, my recommendations for Zaire. In I 
the third section, I also delineated some of the political events 
that will also be necessary to implement, since the current 
political chaos is 95% of the problem. I have addressed the most] 
immediate issues that need to be handled first. There are simple 
too many problems to address in one report, since Zaire's economy 
is basically nonexistent. Progress cannot succeed until these 
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issues are dealt with. It will not be an easy process, but I do 
believe it can be done. Please feel free to contact me for 
advice and assistance. 
These recommendations are made with the assumption that 
President Mobutu Sese Seko will resign or be ousted and that your 
government will assume its rightful place. Also, let me warn you 
that I tried at points in this report to add a little levity to 
make this subject a little easier to digest. Economics has the 
reputation of being "dismal", so this economist attempts to beat 
that label. 
I. BACKGROUND HISTORY 
Zaire's troubles cannot be ascribed to the Belgians who 
colonized and ruled it as the Belgian Congo, nor on the turmoil 
that existed between 1960 and 1964, which brought a United 
Nations peacekeeping force. The trouble can rightfully be placed 
in the hands of the man known as President Mobutu Sese Seko who 
seized control of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 
November 24, 1965 and later renamed it, in 1971, the Republic of 
Zaire. His twenty-eight year autocratic, one-party reign has led 
to the near destruction of the Zairian economy. 
From 1965 to the early 1970's, Zaire prospered, enjoying 
foreign investment. On November 30, 1973, Mobutu announced his 
policy of Zairianization. This policy not only changed the old 
colonial names of cities and geographic features to "proper" 
African names but also usurped control of the nation's 
plantations and companies operated by foreigners and turned them 
over to Zairians (Young & Turner, p. 171). This resulted in a 
slow-down in production because there simply were not enough 
Zairians trained to run these companies, not to mention that most 
of these firms were turned over as pay-offs to political allies 
and military officers (Young & Turner, p. 185). At this time, 
inflation was already high because of the oil crisis. In 1974 
things began to worsen as world prices for copper, Zaire's main 
export, declined. Since then, prices have continued to decline 
and the economy of Zaire has declined with it. 
The situation in Zaire has continued to deteriorate since 
the difficulties of the mid-70s. Since the 1970s, Zaire's debt 
has been rescheduled twelve times. Also, Zaire has failed to 
implement four out of five International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
macro policy agreements (Gulhati, 1990, p. 35). The debt burden 
and the continuing decline of copper prices has placed Zaire in a 
desperate situation. 
As Zaire entered the 1990s, things began to unravel 
completely. On the political scene, Mobutu agreed to some 
democratic reforms. He allowed more political parties to compete 
with the official party of the state and held elections for the 
government. The December 1991 election for Mobutu's position as 
President was never held, however, and months after Prime 
Minister Etienne Tshisekedi was installed, Mobutu replaced him 
with a person of his choice (Walden, p. 2-3). 
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On the economic scene, the government's budget deficit has 
become an increasing problem. The government tried to solve this 
by financing approximately 98% of the deficit by printing more 
zaires, the national currency. This caused hyperinflation which 
reached over 2000% in 1992* Also, Zaire has been unable to pay 
any of its $10 billion debt. This has led to a suspension of aid 
from the IMF and the World Bank. The United States, Belgium and 
France have also halted all aid to Zaire and are calling for 
Mobutu to step down. 
The policies of Mobutu have brought financial disaster to 
Zaire and almost complete ostracization from the international 
community. With this background, the present day situation can 
be understood. 
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE ECONOMY 
In order to keep things concise, this section will describe 
the parts of the current economy that will be addressed by the 
policy recommendations in the third section. 
First, the inflation problem mentioned above—in 1991, Zaire 
experienced an inflation rate of 4229% and 2730% in 1992, 
according to Mobutu's Prime Minister Faustin Birindwa in his 
address to the National Assembly on June 22, 1993. This has 
resulted because of the government's policy of financing the 
budget deficit by simply printing money. The deficit in 1992 
reached 703 billion zaires—up from 22 billion zaires in 1991. 
The money supply increased from 886 million in 1990 to 
approximately 3,600,000 billion in 1993 (Walden, p. 4). 
Hyperinflation is not surprising with such a huge increase in the 
money supply in a short period of time. This hyperinflation has 
knocked a majority of Zairian consumers out of the formal economy 
and has forced them to revert to bartering for necessities. 
Banks have become almost completely useless, since people do not 
deposit what money they have because they must spend it quickly 
before it loses value. This in turn has resulted in a dependence 
on foreign investment, since the banks are unable to maintain 
accounts to lend. Thus, they have become non-functioning in the 
traditional role of financial intermediation. The zaires are 
basically worthless. An example can be found by looking at the 
exchange rate. In April, 1993, 2.5 million zaires traded for one 
U.S. dollar; now, eight months later, it is almost 12 million 
zaires per dollar (BBC, 30 November 1993). 
On October 22, 1993, the government presented its new 
currency plan, announcing the creation of a new zaire which would 
equal 3 million old zaires. The phasing-in process was slated 
for one month but was extended to December 10, 1993 (BBC, 30 
November 1993). What effect will this have on Zaire? None. All I 
this accomplishes is to reduce the amount of zaires one has to 
carry around from three million to one; the currency is still 
worth the same as before. 
Investment is the next area for consideration. As mentioned I 
in the earlier section, investment in Zaire depends largely on 
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that from foreign nations. Hyperinflation threatens this in two 
ways. First, foreign investors do not want to put money into 
Zaire, because as soon as it is invested, it becomes devalued by 
inflation. Secondly, profits cannot be repatriated, and must be 
reinvested immediately before they lose value. Also, there is 
not enough foreign exchange available to import necessary 
equipment and other inputs for production. Yet another problem 
is the deteriorated infrastructure. The rail and road systems 
remain unchanged from colonial times. Transportation for a 
company can be costly. 
One of the major obstacles to foreign investment and aid is 
the debt of Zaire which is approximately $10 billion. It is 
currently unable to pay on the debt which has resulted in a major 
problem. The IMF and the World Bank have suspended all aid to 
Zaire until there is an improvement in the economy. The World 
Bank has suspended a program which would have improved the road 
system in Zaire and, thus, would have helped the transportation 
problem mentioned above. The most important ramification of this 
is that private and public lenders usually consider how a country 
stands with these two organizations when determining loans. With 
both suspending aid to Zaire, prospects for gaining loans are 
slim. On top of that, the U. S., Belgium and France have 
suspended all aid to Zaire until Mobutu is gone and a democracy 
is installed (ironic, considering that these nations, especially 
the U.S., helped keep Mobutu in power during the Cold War). 
Where will the money come from? If funds are being withheld by 
these sources, then what foreign investor will want to risk money 
in Zaire? Only the brave. Zaire must find some way to start 
making payments to regain status with the IMF and World Bank if 
there is to be any hope of an influx of foreign direct 
investment. 
The current situation in Zaire's mineral sector is also 
troubling. Zaire has always been considered to be rich with 
natural resources, which in the past encouraged investment. 
Copper, cobalt and diamonds are the primary minerals mined and 
exported by Zaire (Kaplan, p. 214). Exportation of these 
minerals has been the primary source of foreign exchange through 
trade for Zaire. Due to the recent fall in prices of copper, 
diamonds have become the primary export. Production of these 
minerals and others has fallen drastically, thus further 
decreasing the amount of foreign exchange. If prices drop and 
you export less, then you make less money. Production has 
declined because of fuel shortages and the inability to acquire 
spare parts for machinery. Also, what is produced has a hard 
time getting to its destination because of the transportation 
system. 
The various companies that mine the different minerals are 
either completely state-owned or owned by the state with members 
of the private sector. The only exception is oil firms which are 
mostly owned by foreign oil companies. Because of this strong 
government presence in the mining sector making decisions on 
political grounds, production has been further hampered. All 
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production decisions and hiring or promotions depend on politics 
instead of good, sound business. Nothing can be done to change 
the prices of these minerals on the world market, but production 
can be made more efficient in order to lower costs and increase 
profits. 
The areas discussed here and their sub-issues in the economy 
are some of the most important to be addressed in order to move 
Zaire out of the corner into which past follies have led it. 
Now, it is time to consider solutions. 
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. POLITICAL 
Before economic concerns can be dealt with successfully, 
some political issues must first be addressed. First and 
foremost, Mobutu must be removed, either voluntarily or 
forcefully, and the democratically-elected government must take 
control. Until he is gone and democracy established, no progress 
can be made. 
Second, this government must rally the people behind a 
unifying ideal, such as establishing a democracy. Writing a new, 
more democratic constitution could be the rallying point for the 
nation. This would help alleviate some of the ethnic unrest 
that has started to develop in the eastern part of the country. 
A national identity would help some of the transitions go more 
smoothly. 
Third, the army must become loyal to the new government. 
Since they are currently not paid on time, a good start would be 
to reimburse them for what is past due. Control of the army 
should not rest in the hands of one or of even a few generals. 
This could easily result in a coup. A civilian or committee of 
civilians could be appointed as commander-in-chief. A code of 
honor for troops could be installed to insure that they respect 
the constitution and command structure; if they believe that the 
constitution is to be protected at all costs, then the likelihood 
of a charismatic general gaining their support for a coup is 
lessened. 
Fourth, the new government needs to seek avenues to seize 
all assets of Mobutu and his family plus his elitist allies. 
Those assets have been illegally taken from the people of Zaire. 
The U. S., Belgium and France would probably be very helpful in 
this endeavor. Mobutu's assets have been estimated at 
approximately four billion U. S. dollars; their seizure could 
greatly help Zaire. 
These are probably the most important steps to be taken 
politically in order to establish the stability needed for 
initiating any effective economic policy. The country most 
probably will have unrest with a change of government. It 
probably would be prudent to ask for the United Nations to 
provide assistance in the transition as soon as the new 
government takes power. 
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B. ECONOMIC 
Dealing with inflation must be the number one priority in 
order to restart Zaire's comatose economy. This issue is never 
an easy one to address and has caused many a headache for 
financial ministers across the globe. However, the policy for 
Zaire can take greater risks since there is virtually nothing to 
lose. 
The budget deficit and the government's policy of printing 
the money needed to cover the deficit have created the problem of 
hyperinflation. The government must first make it a policy to 
spend only an amount equal to its revenues. In most countries, 
this could be disastrous but not in Zaire. Unemployment is 
already estimated at 40%, so the shock will be minimal compared 
to the pain already being suffered. In Mobutu's government, it 
has been estimated that approximately 50% of the money allocated 
by the budget has been lost through corruption. This money has 
gone to Mobutu, who has kept a nice chunk for himself and has 
used the rest as pay-offs to political allies. The new 
government may not be corruption-free, but it should be less 
corrupt than in the past. That means that the deficit part of 
the budget, and a little more, was never available to the 
programs for which it was meant. It can be reasoned that these 
programs could remain at the same level of funding and possibly 
see a slight increase in funding. Also, the government must make 
it a policy to no longer print money as a mode for financing the 
deficit. This will be a non-issue once the financial system is 
operating, as long as the government commits itself to such a 
policy. 
Wages need to be frozen for one year to prevent creation of 
inflationary pressure. This should help maintain the current 
level of employment. Even though wages would be frozen, they 
would lose worth much more slowly as inflation decreases. 
Finally, concerning inflation, the government should 
restrict the growth of the money supply to a set percentage (low) 
for a set amount of time. One possibility would be an increase 
of no more than 1% per year for six years. This would allow time 
for the inflation rate to adjust from the changed policies and 
would help to prevent any inflationary actions in times of 
crisis. The government should also set a permanent ceiling for 
money supply growth after the adjustment plan to prevent the 
abuse of the money supply as has happened before. 
With a policy in place and implemented to bring down the 
inflation rate, the IMF and World Bank would likely lift 
suspensions. Upon seeing that the new Zairian government is 
willing to do what is necessary to correct the mistakes of the 
past and to repay their debts, these organizations might be 
willing to help. Once these organizations return, other sources 
of aid and loans would be likely to reconsider assistance. The 
most immediate benefit would be the resumption of the road 
improvement project halted by the World Bank which would help to 
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improve the transportation problem. 
The new government should next solicit aid from those 
nations, mainly the U. S., Belgium and France, which suspended it 
because of Mobutu. The aid requested should address social 
issues that need attention. Specifically, Zaire should set up a 
program to improve education and health care and to solicit aid 
for their support, with the understanding that Zaire would take 
control of the programs when it is able. Governments would be 
more likely to aid these types of programs, especially if given a 
time frame. This would free up Zaire's resources at the onset to 
deal with production issues. This social program should include 
the following points? 
1. Money for medicine 
2. Training of health personnel 
3. Training of teachers 
4. Reinstitution of the AIDS prevention program that was 
successful in Zaire in the mid-80's until funding 
ceased 
5. Materials for primary, secondary and higher education 
Next, the problems of foreign direct investment and mineral 
exports can be addressed simultaneously. First, all the parts of 
companies or complete companies owned by the state should be sold 
to private interests, especially to foreigners. This program 
should give tax breaks for five years to new owners as a period 
of readjustment, promise that firms will be given first priority 
to foreign exchange necessary to purchase inputs, provide tax 
incentives for companies who train Zairians in higher skills and 
management, and insure investors of safety from government 
seizure. This program would help bring in much needed foreign 
investment while improving the efficiency of the mineral sector 
through professional rather than political management as well as 
training Zairians in business and skills. 
Another program should be formed to help foster the creation 
of firms that can link either forwardly or backwardly to the 
mineral sector. An example would be to get Caterpillar to locate 
a plant in order to provide machinery for road improvement 
projects, to build new factory sites, to provide mine equipment, 
and to improve Zaire's access to the Sub-Saharan market which 
will need such products for further development in the region. 
Also, Zaire could encourage a firm to process copper wire or 
cookware and firms that refine industrial or gem quality 
diamonds. Zaire could encourage this by giving these linked 
industries some of the same benefits extended to investors in 
existing firms. The program would include protection for each of 
those industries for a set period of time—possibly 5 or 6 years, 
tax breaks for that same period, foreign exchange priority access 
for inputs, low interest loans (once the banking system has 
started operation again), and improvement of transportation 
routes. 
These policies would improve existing firms and encourage 
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new ones, resulting in the generation of more revenue from taxes, 
even with breaks, improving export revenues, increasing 
production and efficiency of the mineral sector, creating new 
jobs, and improving the skills of Zairian workers. 
An overall policy for these firms concerning repatriation of 
profits should also be established. Firms should be allowed to 
repatriate profits if there is sufficient foreign exchange. The 
government should encourage firms to invest the money in Zaire. 
One possibility is the formation of a stock market as has been 
proposed by the current government (Birindwa, 1993). At this 
time, Zaire's financial market is not able to handle this, but in 
the future it could be a valuable tool to keep profits in the 
domestic market and encourage more investment from abroad. 
Once these initiatives are taken, Zaire should be able to 
stabilize its economy and become productive. Furthermore, Zaire 
should be able to start repayment on its huge debt. A stable 
economy would also improve its chances at gaining further loans 
or rescheduling, though loans should be avoided as much as 
possible. 
Overall, these policies could return Zaire to a stable 
state. By bringing inflation under control through controlled 
government spending, the entire business and economic climate 
would improve. Investors would begin to invest and aid would 
come. This, in turn, would allow improvement in the production 
of minerals and so on and so on. These first few changes would 
in turn bring changes to other parts of the economy. Things 
would start falling into place. But, this is just the beginning; 
many things remain to be done. Here is a brief list of areas 
that will need attention once the economy has stabilized-
1. Agriculture. Invest in this sector to prevent it from 
falling behind. Provide aid to improve techniques and technology 
so production can be increased. Ownership of land should be 
given to farmers to provide an incentive to produce. Zaire is 
diverse enough to have both an agricultural and industrial sector 
that is strong and productive. 
2. Health care. This will need great attention even with 
the suggested social program in place. An AIDS epidemic promises 
to be socially and economically devastating. 
3. Exchange rate. Set exchange rate as a crawling peg to 
prevent it from the great fluctuations of a floating rate but 
giving it some more flexibility than a fixed rate. 
4. Development. Adopt an outward-looking strategy for 
development. Primary export strategy will not work since prices 
for main exports are declining. Foreign exchange is a must, so 
an import substitution strategy will not be effective either. 
Zaire has great promise. Once it becomes economically and 
politically stable, it will develop well because of its vast 
resources. If Mobutu had never taken power, things may have gone 
better for Zaire, but no one will ever know. It still has the 
potential to develop into an economically strong nation with a 
large market. This potential promises that Zaire could be a 
major or the major economic power of the region. Only time will 
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tell. 
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